

CHANGE IN STATUS OF DOCUMENT		DATE 25 Nov 75
TO: DDC-PFA DDC-PPS-2 DDC-PFP DDC-TST-1 NTIS		FROM: DDC-TCA BY (Signature) <i>Madeline Crambaker</i>
SUBJECT AD- A014 179 (GRA-75-22)		
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (Title, Report Number, etc.) <div style="position: relative;"> <div style="position: absolute; top: 20px; left: 20px;"> <i>W</i> </div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 300px; left: 100px;"> Subject document is to be refiched to replace fiche in file because the original had illegible pages (45, 46, 49, 50) </div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 250px; right: 50px; transform: rotate(-30deg);"> <i>Return to me</i> </div> </div>		
TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION <div style="display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap;"> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input type="checkbox"/> CANCEL - SUPERSEDED BY: </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input type="checkbox"/> CANCEL, WITHDRAW FROM HOLDINGS </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN STOCK </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY STOCK </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input type="checkbox"/> DUPLICATE OF </div> <div style="width: 50%;"> <input type="checkbox"/> MAKE CORRECTIONS AS FOLLOWS: </div> </div>		
BASIS FOR REQUESTED ACTION		

ADA014179

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.


23 MAY 1975

RESEARCH PROJECT

DEVELOPMENT OF THE HEAVY-LIGHT CORPS

BY

COLONEL JAMES M. COMPTON
FIELD ARTILLERY



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.

Reproduced by
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
US Department of Commerce
Springfield, VA 22151

[illegible]

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

USAWC MILITARY RESEARCH PROGRAM PAPER

6 DEVELOPMENT OF THE HEAVY-LIGHT CORPS,

9 INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PROJECT,

10 by

Colonel James M. Compton
Field Artillery

12 59
P.

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

11 23 May 75

Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.

1473
DN

403565

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) DEVELOPMENT OF THE HEAVY-LIGHT CORPS		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual Research Project
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) COL James M. Compton, FA		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same as Item 9.		12. REPORT DATE 23 May 1975
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 49
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Beginning with the withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam in 1969, the size of the active Army dropped by almost 50% from close to 1.6 million men in 1969 to less than 800 thousand by 1974. The accelerated withdrawal schedule of 1970-72, coupled with the uncertainties of maintaining adequate forces without the draft and the requirements of other services for increased funds, pointed to further reductions of the active Army. In 1973, the Chief of Staff of the Army told Congress that the Army proposed by the President in		

the FY 74 budget would be capable of deploying a corps anywhere in the world without mobilization. Actions taken by the Army to develop and evaluate the corps size force are examined as well as the guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. The current status of the force is discussed and future actions are recommended in the area of readiness, training, combat service support, force structure, and management. The paper is UNCLASSIFIED to facilitate its use as a reference for students but includes an annotated bibliography of all classified and unclassified documents pertaining to the development of the heavy-light corps concept.

AUTHOR(S): James M. Compton, COL, FA

TITLE: Development of the Heavy-Light Corps

FORMAT: Individual Research Project

DATE: 23 May 1975 **PAGES:** 49

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Beginning with the withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam in 1969, the size of the active Army dropped by almost 50% from close to 1.6 million men in 1969 to less than 800 thousand by 1974. The accelerated withdrawal schedule of 1970-72, coupled with the uncertainties of maintaining adequate forces without the draft and the requirements of other services for increased funds, pointed to further reductions of the active Army. In 1973, the Chief of Staff of the Army told Congress that the Army proposed by the President in the FY 74 budget would be capable of deploying a corps anywhere in the world without mobilization. Actions taken by the Army to develop and evaluate the corps size force are examined as well as the guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. The current status of the force is discussed and future actions are recommended in the area of readiness, training, combat service support, force structure, and management. The paper is UNCLASSIFIED to facilitate its use as a reference for students but includes an annotated bibliography of all classified and unclassified documents pertaining to the development of the heavy-light corps concept.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	ii
LIST OF TABLES	iv
LIST OF FIGURES	v
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. POST-VIETNAM FORCE PLANNING (1969-1972)	4
III. MAINTAINING THE BASELINE (1973-1975)	12
IV. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE	20
V. EVALUATION AND CURRENT STATUS	25
VI. FACTORS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION	29
Readiness	29
Training	31
Combat Service Support	32
Force Structure	33
Management	34
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	37
ANNEX A. LIST OF INTERVIEWS	43
ANNEX B. SCORES METHODOLOGY	45

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. ACTIVE ARMY DIVISIONS AND SEPARATE BRIGADES	5
2. VIETNAM TROOP WITHDRAWALS	6
3. PLANNED AND ACTUAL ARMY END STRENGTHS, FY 70-73	7
4. COMPARISON OF TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY, FY 64, 68, 73.	13
5. HISTORY OF ACTIVE ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE.	15
6. THE ARMY'S CHANGING SIZE.	16
7. POST-VIETNAM ARMY STRENGTH.	17

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. MILESTONE SCHEDULE, CONTINGENCY PACKAGES	23

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I do not know, nor do I propose to forecast, when and where some contingency will arise calling for the use of Army forces. I only know that such a contingency probably will arise and it is our business to be prepared for it.¹

With these words, General Creighton W. Abrams, then Chief of Staff, US Army, in his first posture statement to Congress provided the rationale for the formulation of a relatively small, highly ready active Army force which has since become known in Army planning circles as the heavy-light corps. General Abrams further described the force by stating that the 13 division active Army proposed for Fiscal Year 1974 would be capable of deploying "a corps of heavy divisions or a light corps of airborne, airmobile, and infantry divisions without mobilization of the Reserve Components."²

The events leading up to General Abram's statement provide an interesting and informative summary of the problems and frustrations faced by Army force planners during the period 1969-1973. From a peak strength of over 1.5 million men and 19 2/3 divisions in 1969, the Army was reduced in manpower by almost 50% to 811,000 by the end of Fiscal Year 1972 with only 12 2/3 divisions. The rapid withdrawal of forces from Vietnam was the major cause of the reduction; however, intense pressure from the Congress and the Department of Defense also contributed to the problem.

In addition to summarizing the major force planning actions and events which affected Army forces from 1969 to 1973, this paper also

includes a discussion of the first heavy-light corps package jointly developed by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and provides the current status of this package. The summary is based not only on studies performed by TRADOC, FORSCOM, and other Army agencies but also on interviews with unit commanders and staff officers during the period 20-30 April 1975. A list of persons interviewed is at Annex 1.

Finally, factors for further consideration in the areas of readiness, training, combat service support, force structure, and management are discussed along with actions which are required in the future.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. Creighton W. Abrams, Posture Statement, 29 March 1973, p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 9.

CHAPTER II

POST-VIETNAM FORCE PLANNING (1969-1972)

Fiscal Year 1969 marked a turning point in Army force planning. After eight years of gradual build-up of Army strength in Vietnam, the last deployment of maneuver battalions was completed in July, 1968. When President Nixon, on June 8, 1969, announced the first of many withdrawals, there was a ceiling of 549,500 US personnel in Vietnam with the Army portion about 368,000. The leveling off of effort in Vietnam permitted emphasis to be shifted to improving the combat readiness of the active Army worldwide. In addition to 8 1/3 divisions in Vietnam, 4 1/3 divisions were in Europe and 2 in Korea. Five division equivalents were located in CONUS including a mobilized National Guard battalion in Hawaii. One of the brigades of the 5th Infantry Division (mechanized) at Ft. Carson was the mobilized 69th Infantry Brigade. Except for the Europe committed 24th Infantry Division (mechanized), CONUS units were designated as the active Army portion of the Army strategic reserve force (STRAF). This force was designed to respond rapidly and in sufficient strength to reinforce deployed forces or to meet contingencies in areas where there are no deployed forces. Table 1 lists the designations and locations of major Army combat units as of June 30, 1969.

For the next three years the Vietnam withdrawal schedule complicated Army force planning. Even though plans for the withdrawal ("T-Day Planning") had begun in November 1968 with the publication of

TABLE 1.—ACTIVE ARMY DIVISIONS AND SEPARATE BRIGADES

1

Location	Division equivalents	Separate brigades	Unit designations
Vietnam.....	1		1st Infantry Division.
	1		4th Infantry Division.
	1		9th Infantry Division. ¹
	1		23d Infantry Division.
	1		25th Infantry Division.
	1		1st Cavalry Division (airmobile).
	1		101st Airborne Division (airmobile).
	14		173d Airborne Brigade.
	14		199th Infantry Brigade.
	14		1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (mechanized).
	14		3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division.
Total.....	18½		
Korea.....	1		2d Infantry Division.
	1		7th Infantry Division.
Total.....	2		
Europe.....	1		3d Armored Division.
	1		4th Armored Division.
	1		3d Infantry Division (mechanized).
	1		8th Infantry Division (mechanized).
	14		3d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (mechanized).
		1	Berlin Brigade.
Total.....	4½	1	
United States:			
Fort Hood.....	1		1st Armored Division.
Do.....	1		2d Armored Division.
Fort Carson.....	1		5th Infantry Division (mechanized). ²
Fort Riley.....	14		24th Infantry Division (mechanized), less 1 brigade.
Fort Bragg.....	1		82d Airborne Division.
Hawaii.....	14		29th Infantry Brigade. ³
Fort Knox.....		1	194th Armored Brigade.
Fort Benning.....		1	197th Infantry Brigade.
Alaska.....		1	171st Mechanized Brigade.
Do.....		1	172d Mechanized Brigade.
Do.....		1	172d Mechanized Brigade.
Total.....	45	4	
Panama.....		1	193d Infantry Brigade.
Grand total.....	19½	6	

¹ Total division equivalents in Vietnam will decrease from 8½ to 7½ when the redeployment of 2 brigades of the 9th Infantry Division is completed in August 1969.

² Includes 69th Infantry Brigade, mobilized from the ANG.

³ Mobilized from the ANG.

⁴ Division equivalents in United States will increase to 5½ in August 1969 as a result of redeployment to Hawaii of 1 brigade of the 9th Infantry Division.

⁵ Total division equivalents will decrease to 19½ in August 1969 after inactivation of 1 of the 2 brigades of the 9th Infantry Division redeploying from Vietnam.

TABLE 2
VIETNAM TROOP WITHDRAWALS

<u>Date of Announcement</u>	<u>Date to be Completed</u>	<u>Increment Number</u>	<u>DOD Withdrawal</u>	<u>New DOD Limit</u>	<u>Army Withdrawal</u>	<u>New Army Limit</u>
--	--	--	--	549,500 (a)	-	368,000 (a)
June 8, 1969	August 31, 1969	I	-25,000	524,500	-15,400	352,600
Sep 16, 1969	Dec 5, 1969	II	-40,500	484,000	-14,600	338,000
Dec 15, 1969	Apr 15, 1970	III	-50,000	434,000	-29,500	308,500
Apr 20, 1970	May 1, 1971	IV-VI	-150,000	284,000	-95,100	213,400
Apr 7, 1971	Dec 1, 1971	VII-IX	-100,000	184,000	-71,800	141,600
Nov 12, 1971	Feb 1, 1972	X	-45,000	139,000	-36,700	104,900
Jan 13, 1972	May 1, 1972	XI	-70,000	69,000	-55,200	49,700
Apr 26, 1972	July 1, 1972	XII	-20,000	49,000	-12,100	37,600
June 28, 1972	Sep 1, 1972	XIII	-10,000	39,000	-8,600	29,000
Aug 29, 1972	Nov 30, 1972	XIV	-12,000	27,000	-7,300	21,700
Jan 23, 1973	(b)	--	-27,000	--	-21,700	--

(a) Ceiling prior to June 8, 1969

(b) 60 days after signing peace agreement

Sources: OASD (c), The Economics of Defense Spending--A Look At the Realities, July 1972, p. 149. HqDA, Letters of Instruction, (Incremental Redeployment of US Army Forces from RVN), June 69 to Oct 72.

a detailed T-day directive, the actual schedule bore little resemblance to the hypothesized planning estimates. Table 2 lists the strength limits based on successive Presidential announcements. One of the objectives of the T-day plan was to provide for the accomplishment of a phasedown of active Army forces to approved postwar ("baseline") levels while concurrently repositioning forces and equipment to meet worldwide commitments. Unfortunately, the baseline level was apparently never "approved" since it, along with the size of the Army, continued to drop. Prior to the Vietnam build-up, the so-called baseline was 16 1/3 divisions. From 1969 to 1972, the "baseline" dropped from 16 1/3 to 14 2/3 to 13 2/3 to 13 1/3 to 13 divisions. The results of this "sliding floor" can be illustrated by comparing Army end strengths used as planning estimates in preparing the President's budgets with the actual end strengths achieved some 18 months later in the cycle. For the FY 1970 budget, a planning estimate of 19 1/3 divisions and 1,491,000 end strength was used.² By 30 June 1970, Army strength had dropped to 1,322,000 with 17 1/3 divisions. Table 3 compares planned and actual end strengths for FY 70-73.

TABLE 3

PLANNED AND ACTUAL ARMY END STRENGTHS, FY 70-73³

	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>
Planned	1,491,000	1,240,000	942,000	841,000
Actual	1,322,000	1,124,000	811,000	801,000
Reduction	-11.3	-9.4	-13.9	-4.8

The withdrawal from Vietnam was not the only factor complicating the job of Army force planners. In October 1969, Department of Defense initiated a new system for planning, programming, and budgeting.⁴ Under this system, the service Secretaries are required to submit their five year recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in a document titled Program Objective Memorandum. This document is submitted in May and, after review and analysis by the OSD staff and decision by SECDEF, becomes the basis for the service budget for the following year. The initial service submission is based on fiscal, logistic, and strategic guidance provided by SECDEF. Thus, each of the planning estimates of Army end strength, shown in Table 3, represented the best estimate of not only the Secretary of Army but also Secretary of Defense and Administration officials. If more accurate information was known, it was not made available to the planners.

Table 3 indicates that the actual end strength for FY 72 was almost 14% less than had been requested in the budget. After preparation of the budget in late 1970, the President announced a 100,000 (71,800 Army) Vietnam withdrawal to be completed by 1 December 1971 (mid-FY 72) resulting in an overage of 23,000 manyears in the Army budget. Secondly, Congress mandated a 50,000 manyear reduction (including the 23,000 overage). General William C. Westmoreland, in his March 1972 posture statement to Congress, indicated that the Congressional ceiling on the average strength of the Army manyears signaled a "new era in manpower management."⁵ Since average size is mandated, the factors of when the ceiling is imposed and the time frame in which the goal must be met are extremely critical. For example, a 1,000 manyear reduction in average strength means a 1,000

man change in end strength, if the decision is made early enough to permit a constant reduction of 1,000 men from the beginning of the fiscal year. However, it means a 2,000 man change in end strength if it begins in the middle of the year. General Westmoreland also indicated that a planned, orderly change in the trained strength of the Army requires about 10 months lead time. Public Law 92-129 became effective on 28 September 1971. It established the Army's average strength for FY 72 at 974,309--a level 50,000 below the budget request submitted in January 1971. The passage of this law, 3 months after FY 72 began, triggered a series of managerial actions and decisions, the results of which were to have far-reaching and significant impact upon the Army.⁶ These actions resulted in an end strength of 811,000 on 30 June 1972. Over 500,000 men left the Army during FY 72, while another 187,000 joined the Army through enlistments and the draft.⁷

During the period leading up to passage, the Army was attempting to complete action on the FY 73-77 POM. The initial submission on 29 June 1971 was made inoperative with the likelihood of passage of the 50,000 manyear cut. Thus, a revised 73-77 POM was submitted on 21 July 1971. Two alternative cases were provided, both achieving the 50,000 manyear cut. One case called for a 11 division Army and one included 13 divisions. The 13 division proposal did not meet the fiscal guidance of SECDEF but did provide sufficient divisions to comply with NATO contingency requirements. The 11 division case was within fiscal constraints but was not acceptable from a mission standpoint. In August, 1971, after a meeting of service Chiefs of Staff with the President, SECDEF issued new fiscal guidance which allowed the Army

to plan for 13 divisions. President Nixon addressed this issue when he stated in his foreign policy statement to Congress in February, 1972:

. . . the major issue in the Fiscal Year 1973 program was the number of Army divisions necessary to support our post-Vietnam strategy. After reviewing the effect on allied capabilities in Europe and Asia of an Army ranging between 11 and 14 divisions, I concluded that 13 US Army divisions were needed to support NATO effectively and to retain the capability to reinforce adequately our Asian allies.⁸

Finally, the elimination of the draft had its effect on Army force planning. During the last half of calendar year 1972, 35,000 men were drafted for the Army with all calls terminating in December 1972.⁹ At that time, there was no experience to base future projections upon. Estimates of the sustainable Army size ranged from a low of 600,000 to a high of 867,000 with 731,000 the best estimate.¹⁰ Since, at that time, (mid 1972), no one envisioned the possibility that 13 full divisions could be fielded with a 731,000 man Army, pressures increased for reducing the non-combat forces, the so-called "tail." However, even with massive reductions of headquarters staffs and other support functions, vigorously supported by General Abrams after becoming Chief of Staff in October 1972, Congressional support and achievement of optimistic enlistment goals would be required if the downward trend of Army divisions and end strength were to be stopped.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. Stanley R. Resor, Statement of the Secretary of the Army Before the House Committee on Armed Services, 22 July 1969, p. 3743.
2. Ibid.
3. Planned and actual end strengths taken from posture statements of the Secretary of the Army in 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973.
4. US Department of Defense, DODI 7045.7.
5. William C. Westmoreland, Posture Statement, 8 March 1972, p. 9.
6. For a complete discussion of the 50,000 man-year subject, see USAWC AY 75 Case Study, "50,000 Man-Year Reduction: An Example of Crisis Management and Decisionmaking," 26 September 1974.
7. Creighton W. Abrams, Posture Statement, 29 March 1973, p. 11.
8. Elliot L. Richardson, Posture Statement, 10 April 1973, p. 5.
9. Richard M. Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970's, 1972, p. 165.
10. Unpublished ODCSPER, Hq DA estimates made during the period June-October 1972.

CHAPTER III

MAINTAINING THE BASELINE (1973-1975)

As preparation of the FY 74-78 POM and the FY 74 budget got underway, many Army force planners recognized that it was highly possible that OSD and Congressional actions could result in further reduction of the Army's 13 active division baseline force. Despite the 50% reduction in Army strength from the Vietnam peaks, pressure continued for further cuts particularly in deployed forces. Congress had partially justified passage of the 50,000 manyear cut in 1971 by indicating that some of the savings could be taken from "support" forces in Europe. In testimony by General William E. DePuy, then Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army, before a Congressional subcommittee in 1972, Congress was told that "it costs almost exactly the same amount of money to keep a division in Europe and keep one in the United States."² Thus, if Congress decided to legislate the removal of one or more of the Army divisions in Europe, this would most likely also result in a reduction in the overall number of divisions.

Reduction of funds for the Army was also anticipated. Within Department of Defense, a shift in allocation of available funds from the Army to the Navy was apparent with a distinct possibility that the Army's share of Defense funds could return to the pre-Vietnam level of 24-25%. Table 4 lists Total Obligational Authority for the three services.

TABLE 4

COMPARISON OF TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY¹
FY 64, 68, 73 (\$ Bil)

	<u>FY 64</u>		<u>FY 68</u>		<u>FY 73</u>	
Army	12.3	24.3%	25.0	33.1%	21.7	27.0%
Navy	14.5	28.6%	20.8	27.5%	25.4	31.6%
Air Force	20.0	39.4%	24.9	32.9%	24.7	30.7%
Other	3.9	7.7%	4.9	6.5%	8.7	10.7%
Total DOD	50.7	100.0%	75.6	100.0%	80.5	100.0%

It was therefore determined that the Army's budget submission for FY 74 should emphasize the necessity to stabilize Army strength at 13 active divisions with about 800,000 men. The Secretary of the Army defined the 13 division active Army as the "Army's baseline force, the absolute minimum force essential to support currently stated national policies."³ He emphasized the intent of the Army to maximize combat capability by stating that the Army "will increase the manpower devoted to our combat division forces by almost 4,000 despite reduction of approximately 21,000 in total active Army strength."⁴

In his statement to Congress, General Abrams stressed the need for a strong, modern, and balanced active Army force capable of "deploying and fighting wherever our government has determined its national interests are threatened. . . ."⁵ As mentioned previously, General Abrams also discussed the deployment of a corps in a non-mobilization contingency. While non-mobilization contingencies have been mentioned in previous posture statements by SECDEF and

Army witnesses, this is believed to have been the first time in recent years that the approximate size of the force had been specified in an unclassified statement.

In designing the FY 74 budget force, force planners were required to program 100% manning for all division force units in CONUS and Hawaii. This represented a change from previous years when it was considered satisfactory to man active units at an average of 90%. Further, all divisions in CONUS were fully structured with three active brigades, thus insuring rapid deployment without reliance on Reserve Component units. 100% manning for CONUS divisional forces was made possible by a decision made in 1970 which no longer required each active division to be matched with an active Initial Support Increment (ISI).⁶ Prior to Vietnam, the 16 1/3 active divisions were supported by 16 1/3 ISI's. This one-for-one policy continued during the war years until FY 1971 when only 12 ISI's were authorized for 13 2/3 divisions. From then until FY 1974, force planners were guided by the "1+1" policy which required that each active division would be supported by at least one initial or sustaining support increment plus one other. The extra increment theoretically provided structure spaces to support the LOC/Port package.⁷ Table 5 displays a history of active Army force structure from 1961 to 1976. Table 6 graphically displays actual end strengths of the active Army during critical periods of the last 25 years. Table 7 provides annual and cumulative percent changes in active Army end strength since 1969.

TABLE 5


HISTORY OF ACTIVE ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE
Manpower (000)

FY	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76
DIVISION EQUIVALENTS	14	18	16-1/3	16-1/3	16-1/3	18	18-2/3	19-2/3	19-2/3	17-1/3	13-2/3	12-2/3	13	13	14-1/3	16
INITIAL SUPPORT INCREMENT (ISI)	13	18	16-1/3	16-1/3	15-1/3	18	18-1/3	19-2/3	19-2/3	17-1/3	12) 14-1/3	14	14	13-2/3	13-2/3
SUSTAINING SPT INCREMENT (SSI)	4-1/3	6	5	4-1/3	4-1/3	6	11-2/3	12	12-2/3	10	7-1/3					
AUTHORIZED DIVISION FORCES	483	636	536	529	498	535	757	714	713	649	468	385	408	398	414	440
AUTH SPECIAL MISSION FORCES	107	110	100	104	131	122	138	191	187	168	195	138	108	104	92	86
AUTHORIZED GENERAL SUPPORT FORCES	185	199	217	209	194	242	229	227	227	231	207	179	169	149	145	137
AUTH INDIVIDUALS	84	121	123	130	145	300	328	403	406	315	236	159	140	132	134	122
AUTHORIZED END STRENGTH	859	1066	976	972	968	1199	1452	1535	1533	1363	1107	861	825	783	785	785
ACTUAL END STRENGTH	859	1066	976	973	969	1200	1443	1570	1512	1322	1124	811	801	782	-	-

SOURCE: Various Posture Statements

Table 6

THE ARMY'S CHANGING SIZE



SOURCE: Various Posture Statements

TABLE 7 POST-VIETNAM ARMY STRENGTH

<u>Military Strength</u> (000)		<u>Change</u>			
		<u>Annual</u>		<u>Cumulative</u>	
End FY 68 ¹	1570				
69 ¹	1512	-58	-4%	-58	-4%
70 ¹	1323	-189	-13%	-247	-16%
71 ¹	1124	-199	-15%	-446	-28%
72 ¹	811	-313	-28%	-759	-48%
73 ¹	801	-10	-1%	-769	-49%
74 ¹	783	-18	-2%	-787	-50%
75 ²	785	+2	--	-785	-50%
76 ²	785	--	--	-785	-50%

¹ Actual Strengths

² Projected Strengths - FY 76 Presidential Budget

SOURCE: Various Posture Statements

Finally, spaces were generated by the massive reorganization of the Army in 1973-74 with the creation of the Training and Doctrine and Forces Commands and the disestablishment of the Continental Army and Combat Developments Commands. Additionally, significant reductions were made in the size of headquarters, particularly in the Headquarters, Department of the Army. These actions, along with others, enabled the Army not only to stabilize end strength at slightly below 800,000 but also to provide a greater number of combat units with an increase of combat power of 17% for a less than 2% increase in budget cost.⁸

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. James R. Schlesinger, Posture Statement, March 4, 1974, p. 235.
2. US Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Active Duty and Reserve Forces, Hearings on Military Posture, 1972, p. 11842.
3. Robert F. Froehlke, Posture Statement, March 1973, p. 7.
4. Ibid., p. 8.
5. Creighton W. Abrams, Posture Statement, 29 March 1973, p. 9.
6. Prior to 1972, a division force consisted of a division, an ISI and a SSI. The division was the basic combat unit and, for gross force planning purposes, was considered to have 16,000 at full strength. The initial support increment (ISI) includes the non-divisional support units required for initial (up to 60 days) support of the division in combat (16,000 men). The sustaining support increment (SSI) includes those additional support units required to sustain the division in combat indefinitely (16,000 men). Since 1972, force planners no longer refer to separate ISI's and SSI's but rather aggregate non-divisional support into support increments (SI).
7. The Line of Communication Port Facilities (LOC/Port) concept was initially approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 11 September 1969. It was developed by the Army as a substitute for the line of communication through France and envisioned the prepositioning of material in the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries with personnel of designated units scheduled to be airlifted in the early stages of a European conflict. Because of Congressional objections, funds were never appropriated to move and maintain the equipment. The FY 76-80 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) addresses a new concept which will change the name to Minimum Required Logistical Augmentations Europe (MR-LOGAEUR) and reduce the number of units. Stanley R. Resor, Posture Statement, March 1971, pp. II-29-32.
8. Frederick C. Weyand, Posture Statement, February 9, 1975, p. 18.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE PLANNING GUIDANCE

The Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG), issued annually by the Secretary of Defense each October, sets forth the current objectives, policies, and general planning guidance for the defense program. It outlines the President's national security policies, takes into consideration the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and interprets US defense policies for all defense activities. Following review of Volume II of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, wherein the Joint Chiefs of Staff present their recommended force levels, the SECDEF issues the Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum (PPGM). This basic planning document provides force and fiscal guidance to the Services and identified selected force and fiscal constraints to be used in the formulation of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) by each Service. Based on the DPPG and PPGM, force planners then develop the overall force which best meets the guidance.

Determining the size, composition, and deployment of general purpose forces is considerably more difficult than determining requirements for strategic forces. Obviously, it is impossible to attempt to provide forces that could respond to every conceivable contingency requiring the use of military force. Thus, force requirements are based on an analysis of the most demanding contingencies that could arise in theaters of primary interest to the United States. Focusing on selected theaters and contingencies does not preclude the use of forces in other areas. It does permit the establishment of a baseline

force and provides a capability both to deal with other contingencies that arise and to perform a variety of other functions in support of national policy. Baseline forces should be continually tested to determine their adequacy against other alternatives.¹

In the 1960's, general purpose forces were designed to provide the capability to deal simultaneously with the initial stages of war in Europe, a war in Asia, and a minor contingency elsewhere. In 1970, the guidance was changed to remove the requirement to simultaneously fight in Europe and Asia. Current guidance requires the capability to deal simultaneously with one major contingency (wherever it may occur) and one minor contingency, with forces able to "swing" with some speed from one major theater to the other.² The two contingencies that constituted the main basis for force planning in FY 75 were:

- an attack on NATO by the nations of the Warsaw Pact, led by the USSR;

- an attack in either Northeast or Southeast Asia with the direct involvement of the forces of a major power.

These two contingencies provide a measure of the threats that could be deployed against the United States and its allies and provide the principal variables that determine the qualitative aspects of our forces.³

While Europe and Asia remain important for force-planning purposes, it is essential to maintain reserves centrally located in the Continental United States if forces are to be able to respond rapidly and effectively to any emergency or minor contingency as directed by the President and approved by the Congress.⁴

It was this minor contingency requirement which caused the Army Chief of Staff, in May 1973, to direct the Army staff to develop three active Army contingency force packages. Two of the packages would support the major contingencies in Europe and Asia and the third would support the minor contingency.⁵ Two previous Army staff studies, Total Force Structure and Active Army Contingency Force, had indicated the need to specifically identify the minimum numbers and types of units which must be retained in the active Army. First priority for development was given to the minor contingency force, which was identified as the Heavy-Light Corps (HLC). Figure 1 displays the milestone schedule used by the DA staff for the action.


In July 1973, the ACSFOR provided the commanders of TRADOC and FORSCOM with an initial troop list and specific guidance on capabilities of the constrained-size force. Each commander was asked to evaluate various aspects of the force and to submit recommendations by 1 September 1973. DA approved and distributed the revised troop list in November 1973. Commander, FORSCOM published the troop lists in April 1974 and directed that units assigned to the HLC force package be capable of deployment for non-NATO contingencies by 1 July 1974.⁶ Thus, theoretically, the Army was prepared to deploy a corps by the end of Fiscal Year 1974 as General Abrams had stated to Congress in March 1973.

Unified commanders were notified of the availability of the package through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Army component commanders and other major commanders were provided guidance for the employment of the package in Volume I of the Army Capabilities Plan, published in April 1974.

FIGURE 1

MILESTONE SCHEDULE
CONTINGENCY PACKAGES

15 JUNE 1973



MILESTONES SEQUENCED BY EVENT

PROGRAMMED COMPLETION

DATE	EVENTS
N/A	1. Start
24 May 73	2. CSM received.
30 May 73	3. Additional tasks determined by ACSFOR.
3 Jun 73	4. Other DA Staff agencies provided guidance.
3 Jun 73	5. ODCSOPS provided additional guidance.
1 Apr 74	6. Prepare notification to Unified Cnds.
30 Apr 74	7. Unified Cnds have packaging concept.
30 Aug 73	8. Scenarios complete.
1 Jul 73	9. ACSFOR revises troop list.
10 Jul 73.	10. ACSFOR finalizes troop lists.

PROGRAMMED COMPLETION

DATE	EVENTS
1 Sep 73	11. DCSER provided scenarios.
10 Jul 73	12. Letter to TRADOC.
10 Jul 73	13. Letter to FORSCOM.
1 Sep 73	14. Units identified.
1 Sep 73	15. Non-Army units identified.
15 Sep 73	15a. Army staff recommendations to CSA.
1 Sep 73	16. Dual based units identified.
1 Oct 73	17. Activate/inactivate critical units.
1 Oct 73	18. Final troop list to DCSLOG.
1 Oct 73	19. Final troop list to COA.
15 Mar 74	20. Cost analysis completed.

PROGRAMMED COMPLETION

DATE	EVENTS
1 Nov 73	21. DAMPL adjustments completed.
1 Apr 74	22. Long-range stationing plan completed.
1 Mar 74	23. Lift requirements completed.
1 Apr 74	24. Movement analysis completed.
1 May 74	25. LOG analysis completed.
1 May 74	26. DA staffing article completed.
1 May 74	27. ODCSOPS completes all required actions.
1 May 74	28. TRADOC completes doctrine.
1 Apr 74	29. DCSER completes plan on replacements.
30 Jun 74	30. Contingency Packages completed.

SOURCE: Unpublished ODCSOPS files.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. James R. Schlesinger, Posture Statement, March 1974, p. 83.
2. James R. Schlesinger, Posture Statement, March 1975, p. III-10.
3. Schlesinger, March 1974, p. 86.
4. Schlesinger, March 1975, p. III-11.
5. Chief of Staff Memorandum 73-71-56, p. 1. CONFIDENTIAL.
6. US Department of Army, Hq FORSCOM, letter to FORSCOM units, 2 April 1974, CONFIDENTIAL.

CHAPTER V

EVALUATION AND CURRENT STATUS

As previously indicated, the commanders of TRADOC and FORSCOM were directed by the Chief of Staff to submit recommended changes to the initial HLC troop list prepared by the Army staff.

Commander, FORSCOM was asked to identify specific units to fill requirements for the package. In addition, recommended changes to the ALO's and DAMPL priorities were solicited as well as a list of recommended activations and inactivations.¹ FORSCOM's reply included a revised troop list and a shortfall list of 42 units.²

From 23 September to 10 November 1974, the XVIII Airborne Corps conducted CABER WARRIOR II, a command post exercise. The size and scope of this exercise provided an opportunity to exercise the full range of operational readiness requirements in alerting, deploying, and employing units of the Light Corps. The exercise was unique in that emphasis was placed on the deployment phase of the operation rather than the tactical employment phase. The CONUS movement deployment phase centered around the development of data, scheduling of available assets and the issuance of movement orders to move Light Corps units to ports of embarkation for further movement overseas. CG XVIII Airborne Corps, acting as CINCARRED, deployed the units from home stations. Deployment was designed to utilize all available surface modes including rail, bus, and organic vehicles. Overseas deployment planning included detailed scheduling of units and resupply requirements by air and sea with the majority of the requirements moving by sea.

Detailed information on the exercise is included in the after action report.⁴ A similar exercise is to be conducted by III Corps in late 1975.⁵

Commander, TRADOC was tasked to review the package for impact on mission accomplishment and, if appropriate, develop new concepts of operation. Specific guidance indicated that the corps would include three divisions and would be deployable without mobilization for worldwide commitment. Limited guidance on logistics policies was also provided.⁶ To evaluate mission accomplishment, Commander, TRADOC, used a newly developed methodology titled Scenario Oriented Recurring Evaluation System (SCORES). Through the use of standard scenarios, all of the TRADOC centers and schools are able to conduct a coordinated effort in assessing the capabilities of current forces under specified conditions and identify recommended improvements to the doctrine, organization, and materiel of current Army forces. A detailed explanation of the SCORES methodology is at Annex B. The Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA) at Ft. Leavenworth was assigned responsibility for conducting the evaluation. The evaluation is an examination of three hypothetical corps packages in nonnuclear, mid-intensity Middle Eastern scenarios. It was designed and conducted to determine the tactical viability of the corps under the conditions depicted, to time phase the deployment sequence of elements of the corps, and to identify shortfalls in the organization, doctrine, and materiel of the forces employed and examined. The findings of the evaluation are based on a subjective, low-resolution, analysis of the elements of the three corps packages in a variety of scenario missions. The

analysis was conducted by all centers and schools of the TRADOC combat developments community. Each center/school examined those units and capabilities for which it is proponent, and all aspects of the corps were scrutinized. In addition, representatives from other Army and Air Force agencies participated. The three corps packages which were studied include the Light Corps, the Heavy Corps, and a Modified Heavy Corps. Composition of the packages as well as the conclusions and recommendations of the analysis are included in the CACDA study report.⁶

One of the major determinants of the viability of the HLC concept is the capability of strategic lift assets to transport the corps within the time periods specified. As a follow-on study to the CACDA analysis, the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) was tasked to analyze the air and sealift capabilities to deploy the Modified Heavy Corps to the Middle East and to determine those strategic air and sealift assets required to meet the unit required delivery dates established by TRADOC. The study determines the capabilities of the lift assets in five different cases and indicates the increases in air assets required to meet the specified delivery dates.⁷

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. Department of Army, ACSFOR, letter to CDR FORSCOM, 17 July 1973, SECRET.
2. Department of Army, Hq FORSCOM, letter to ACSFOR, 5 September 1973, CONFIDENTIAL.
3. Department of Army, ACSFOR, letter to CDR, TRADOC, 17 July 1973, SECRET.
4. After Action Report, CPX CABER WARRIOR II, Hq XVIII Airborne Corps, 12 March 1975, CONFIDENTIAL.
5. US Department of Army, The Chief of Staff, personal letter to CDR FORSCOM, 14 February 1975, SECRET.
6. Report, Heavy/Light Corps Middle East (HLC-ME) Evaluation, US Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, 3 volumes, July 1974, SECRET NO FORN.
7. Report, Strategic Mobility Analysis: Modified Corps--Middle East, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, October 1974, SECRET NO FORN.

CHAPTER VI

FACTORS FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

At the DA and TRADOC/FORSCOM level, the HLC concept is fairly well understood. One of the most important reasons for establishing the corps package was to provide DA force planners with a list of units which must be retained on active duty if the active Army is to be capable of deploying up to a corps size force in support of a unilateral military action without requiring mobilization. However, as with any plan generated at the Pentagon level, the understanding and knowledge of the concept decreases as you move away from Headquarters, Department of the Army. The factors which follow are offered to stimulate discussion and future actions which are believed necessary to insure that units of the HLC package are capable of deploying and fighting as a coordinated tactical force.

Readiness

Readiness of HLC units is measured at both Department of the Army and at FORSCOM level primarily by monitoring the REDCON status of units of the HLC package. The Army Status Report, commonly called the "blue book," includes a page which displays battalion and company size units by C1, C2, C3, and C4 readiness status. Data is updated based on unit readiness reports. At FORSCOM, the Monthly Readiness Summary includes detailed information regarding manpower, training, and equipment status for about 200 reporting units of the HLC package. Again, the information is based on data included in the unit readiness

report. XVIII Airborne Corps, in its Readiness Management Center (REDMAC) has detailed information on all assigned units and all units included in the Airborne D force package.¹ Information on other units of the HLC package is not currently available. III Corps personnel have readiness data only for assigned units located at Ft. Hood.

XVIII Airborne Corps is authorized to conduct Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises for all units of the "D" package. These exercises are unannounced and include a determination of a units capability in five major categories: alert and assembly, preparation for deployment, deployment, field exercise, and live fire exercises.² Corps personnel also have access to readiness data via a special data link to the FORSTAT file at FORSCOM headquarters. A similar capability does not exist at Ft. Hood.

Actions Required. In order to adequately monitor readiness of the entire HLC package, the status of all units should be known at some level. About 100 detachment size units do not submit unit readiness reports. Except for detachments of the "D" package, their status is therefore unknown above the installation level. Responsibility for monitoring readiness should be divided between the two corps. Consideration should be given to authorizing both corps to conduct readiness exercises for all HLC units as XVIII Airborne Corps now does for "D" package units. Headquarters, DA should require the commanders of FORSCOM and the two corps to provide a narrative readiness report on the collective readiness of all rapid response force packages to include the HLC package. The installation commanders of the 30 installations with assigned HLC units should be provided with definite

instructions as to their responsibilities in support of the various packages. If, for example, an armored cavalry regiment, three air defense battalions and an air defense group are programmed for deployment from Ft. Bliss in the first seven days by air and surface means, then the installation commander should be given the mission and resources to prepare for this contingency. Otherwise, it is totally unrealistic to expect that the programmed schedule will be met, regardless of the availability of lift assets. In November, 1973, Hq DA suggested to FORSCOM that readiness of the HLC should be monitored in a manner similar to that of the Airborne D.³

Training

As previously mentioned, CABER WARRIOR II emphasized the unit operations which occur prior to overseas movement. This is the unglamorous side of training that is frequently neglected in most units. Understandably, most maneuver battalion commanders devote their scarce training hours and dollars to tactical training. However, in preparing for the quick reaction contingency envisioned for HLC package units, a larger share of the training budget should be devoted to preparation for movement. For a corps size operation, the majority of the force requirements will probably deploy overseas by sea and move to the port of embarkation by surface means.

Actions Required. At the installation level, emphasis should be placed on improving the capability of assigned units to load on trucks or railcars. FORSCOM should survey the 30 HLC installations to determine resources required to deploy HLC units in the time required.

Intermediate command and control headquarters, such as brigades and groups, should be assigned responsibilities for pre-deployment supervision of training of units to be assigned upon deployment. While it is recognized that the final task organization must be tailored to a specific contingency, a tentative listing of units showing probable control headquarters could be distributed for training and planning purposes. Because of the limited number of headquarters on the troop list, the force planner doesn't have much choice at the brigade and group level. It is particularly important that the combat service support chain of command be established in advance in order that support levels and procedures can be determined based on the supported units' characteristics and equipment. Hq DA suggested in November 1973 that coordination and command lines among the units of the package be established.⁴

Combat Service Support

In order to provide adequate support for a corps size force which is deployed on short notice, many actions must be taken prior to deployment.

Actions Required. An equipment density list, by make and model, is needed by support planners at all levels in order to complete stockage levels for repair parts and float equipment. Insofar as possible, supported units with similar makes and models should be supported by the same unit. Distribution plans for new equipment should be reviewed for impact on HLC support. It may be desirable to substitute units or change the distribution plan. As "BIG 5" items came into the inventory

it may be desirable to provide selected HLC units with the newer items rather than issuing them to Europe-oriented units. If this is done, HLC support units will need to have the capability to support the new items.

Force Structure

The size of the force to be deployed from the HLC package was deliberately limited in order to keep the force at a manageable level. In doing so, it was recognized that certain situations would require types of units which could not be included in the basic package. Thus, the original DA guidance directed that add-on packages be developed wherever required. Possible areas include over the shore operations, water distribution, civil affairs, special forces, and psychological operations.

Likewise, it was recognized that there are some units which would be required in a combat situation overseas that need virtually no training in advance of deployment. These units, primarily medical, can be formed from existing peacetime units and activities on relatively short notice providing adequate instructions have been issued in advance. At one time, there were over 25 units designated as unmanned in the HLC package.

Another means used during peacetime to save spaces is to include Type B units on the troop list. These units are filled with civilian indigenous personnel after arrival in the theater or can be brought to full strength just before deployment. At one time about 15 HLC units were type B units.

Actions Required. Requirements for add-on packages should be determined and unit identifications established. Despite a recognized need for these packages, specific actions have not been taken at any of the headquarters visited.

Plans for activating and equipping unmanned units should be published and distributed as soon as possible. Hq DA requested the FORSCOM plan to be submitted by February 1974.⁵ As of April, 1975, it had not been submitted.

Consideration should be given to replacing Type B units with full strength units for planning purposes. It may not be feasible to hire and train sufficient indigenous personnel in the time allowed. If Type B units are to be brought to full strength prior to deployment, planning guidance should be changed accordingly and full strength authorizations should be used instead of Type B strengths.

Management

Despite the fact that the HLC concept has existed for over two years, there is still confusion, particularly at lower units, over the use of the package. From the beginning, it was intended that the HLC package would include a representative group of active Army units from which force planners could tailor a balanced corps size force that would be capable of rapid deployment and could support itself in combat for a limited period. It was never expected that units would be designated as specifically assigned to the heavy corps or light corps. However, this conception exists throughout the Army. At DA, readiness of heavy corps units is discussed separately from light corps units even though most units are in both corps. The plan

published by FORSCOM implies that certain units are unique to the heavy and light corps.⁶ Most personnel at corps and installation level do not realize that there is an unlimited number of corps troop lists that can be developed with units of the package.

Action Required. Consideration should be given to renaming the HLC package as it is believed the name is responsible for part of the confusion. Perhaps a return to the previous Active Army Contingency Force (AACF) title is in order. In any case, DA and FORSCOM should change their method of display.

HLC units are currently located on 30 CONUS installations. Many of the units perform peacetime support duties. This is true primarily for the combat service support units. At least one combat unit, a HAWK battalion, supports annual service practice for non-US units. There may well be other units performing other essential missions which would continue after deployment.

Action Required. FORSCOM should survey every installation with HLC assigned units to determine the post-deployment capability to perform continuing missions. This is particularly important at TRADOC installations where HLC units support school instruction. The results of the survey could lead to changes in the troop list or compilation of a list of required units that could be obtained from the Reserve Components.

CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

1. The evolution of the Airborne D package dates back to May 1965 when USA Strike Command directed XVIII Airborne Corps to support quick reaction contingencies. In July 1968, standardized troop lists were published which reflected structure packages for the Airborne Rifle Company, Airborne Infantry Battalion, Airborne Brigade, and the Airborne Division. These were called A, B, C, and D packages, respectively. The current package includes both divisional and non-divisional units. (Letter, Hq XVIII Abn Corps, Subj: XVIII Airborne Corps/USARFOR Airborne 'D' Package 700 AD, dated 8 January 1974, CONFIDENTIAL)

2. USA Forces Command, FORSCOM Regulation No. 525-2, pp. 1-2.

3. US Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Contingency Packages, 8 November 1973, p. 2, CONFIDENTIAL.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. US Department of Army, Forces Command, Programming Plan 1-75, Appendix 3, CONFIDENTIAL.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrams, GEN Creighton W. Posture Statement Presented to the 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973. Washington: US Department of Defense, 29 March 1973. (UA23 A51 1973 A8).
- Callaway, Howard H. Posture Statement Presented to the 93rd Congress, 2d Session 1974. Washington: US Department of Defense, undated. (UA 23 A51 1974).
- _____. Posture Statement Presented to the 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975. Washington: US Department of Defense, 7 February 1975. (UA 23 A51 1975 C35).
- Froehlke, Robert F. Posture Statement Presented to the 92nd Congress, 2d Session, 1972. Washington: US Department of Defense, 24 February 1972. (UA 23 A51 1972 F 76).
- _____. Posture Statement Presented to the 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973. Washington: US Department of Defense, undated. (UA 23 A51 1973 F 76).
- Nixon, Richard M. US Foreign Policy for the 1970's The Emerging Structure of Peace. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972. Includes rationale for 13 Army divisions.
- Resor, Stanley R. Posture Statement Presented to the 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969. Washington: US Department of Defense, 22 July 1969. (UA 23 A51 1969 R4).
- _____. Posture Statement Presented to the 91st Congress, 2d Session, 1970. Washington: US Department of Defense, undated. (UA 23 A51 1970 R4).
- _____. Posture Statement Presented to the 92d Congress, 1st Session, 1971. Washington: US Department of Defense, undated. (UA 23 A51 1971 R4).
- Richardson, Elliot L. Posture Statement Presented to the 93d Congress, 1st Session, 1973. Washington: US Department of Defense, undated.
- Schlesinger, James R. Posture Statement Presented to the 93rd Congress, 2d Session, 1974. Washington: US Department of Defense, 4 March 1974.
- _____. Posture Statement Presented to the 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975. Washington: US Department of Defense, 5 February 1975.

- US Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military Posture. 2 pts. Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969. (UA 23.3 A67 1969a pt. 2). Includes Secretary Resor's statements not included in written posture statement.
- US Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee No. 2 on Active Duty and Reserve Forces. Hearings on Military Posture. 3 pts. Hearings, 92d Congress, 2d Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972. (UA 23.3 A67 1972a pt. 1 through pt. 3). Statement of LTG William E. DePuy, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army, on 24 February 1972. Presents rationale for strength of Army and describes problems faced by Army planners in developing programs. First use of "overview" briefing format which has since been presented annually to members of Congress and other government audiences. (pp. 11807-11849).
- US Department of Army. The Adjutant General. Letter of Instructions for the Incremental Redeployment of US Army Forces from RVN (U) Washington: 21 June 1969 to 26 October 1972. CONFIDENTIAL. (Series of LOI's issued for each increment). Includes details of RVN withdrawals.
- US Department of Army. Army War College. Case Study. 50,000 Man-Year Reduction: An Example of Crisis Management and Decisionmaking. Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1974. Good source of data on force structure and manpower issues during 1970-72.
- US Department of Army. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. Contingency Packages (U) Washington: 17 July 1973. SECRET. Letter directs Commander, FORSCOM, to review DA proposed HLC package to determine identification of units and recommend activations/inactivations.
- US Department of Army. Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. Contingency Packages (U) Washington: 17 July 1973. SECRET. Letter directs Commander, TRADOC, to review DA proposed HLC package for impact on mission accomplishment and to develop new concept of operations for support constrained forces. Inclosure 1 is troop list. Inclosure 2 is specified guidance for development and review of package.
- US Department of Army. Chief of Staff Memorandum 72-570-245 (U) Guidance for Force Structuring. Washington: 10 November 1972. SECRET. Provides guidance of Army Chief of Staff on force packaging concept to be implemented by end FY 74.

- US Department of the Army. Chief of Staff Memorandum 73-71-56: Contingency Packages. Washington: 24 May 1973. CONFIDENTIAL. Provides guidance to Army Staff for the development of three contingency packages, one of which is to be the heavy-light corps package. Includes limitations on capability of corps if deployed.
- US Department of Army. The Chief of Staff. Personal letter to CDR, FORSCOM, 13 August 1974. SECRET. Acknowledges receipt of 17 July letter and comments on future uses of HLC.
- US Department of Army. The Chief of Staff. Personal letter to CDR, TRADOC, 13 August 1974. SECRET. Acknowledges receipt of 17 July letter and suggests additional areas for study.
- US Department of Army. The Chief of Staff. Personal letter to CDR, FORSCOM, 14 February 1975. SECRET. Acknowledges receipt of 10 January letter and directs conduct of CPX.
- US Department of the Army. Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity. Heavy/Light Corps Middle East (HLC-ME) Evaluation: 3 vol., Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: July 1974. SECRET NOFORN. Study plan, findings and recommendations of TRADOC analysis of light corps, heavy corps, and modified corps. Detailed information on all aspects of HLC.
- US Department of the Army. Concepts Analysis Agency. Strategic Mobility Analysis: Modified Corps--Middle East. Bethesda, MD: October 1974. SECRET NOFORN. Findings and recommendations of CAA analysis conducted after TRADOC HLC study. Good display of alternatives.
- US Department of Army. Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. Contingency Packages. Washington: 8 November 1973. SECRET. Letter provides guidance to TRADOC for analysis of HLC package. Includes assumptions of essential elements of analysis.
- US Department of Army. Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. Contingency Packages. Washington: 8 November 1973. CONFIDENTIAL. Letter provides approval to FORSCOM of HLC troop list and provides guidance for implementation. Requests FORSCOM to direct future efforts toward improving and monitoring the readiness of the HLC package to include formulation and implementation of the appropriate planning, training, coordination, and command lines among the units of the package.
- US Department of Army. DCSOPS. Army Capabilities Plan, Volume 1. Strategic Employment of Army Forces. Washington: 29 April 1974. SECRET. Provides guidance to DA agencies and commands for employment of Army forces and reflects the Army's capability to meet existing requirements within program and budget limitations. Appendix 6 to Annex A includes list of active Army packages.

- US Department of Army. DCSOPS message 011624Z April 1975. Approves FORSCOM request of 9 January 1975 to manage HLC troop list.
- US Department of Army. Hq Forces Command. Contingency Packages. Ft. McPherson, GA: 5 September 1973. CONFIDENTIAL. Letter to ACSFOR provides recommended troop list for HLC package.
- US Department of Army. Hq FORCES Command. Heavy/Light Corps (HLC) Troop List (U). Ft. McPherson, GA: 2 April 1974. CONFIDENTIAL. Letter to all FORSCOM commanders provides HLC troop list and support constraints. Directs that unit commanders be informed that their unit is assigned to the HLC package but prohibits further dissemination.
- US Department of Army. Hq FORSCOM. Personal letter from FORSCOM DCSOPS to Director of Force Programs and Structure, ODCSOPS, Hq DA, 22 November 1974. Provides status of FORSCOM actions on HLC package and advises that consideration is being given to the use of REFORGER units in the HLC.
- US Department of Army. FORSCOM Regulation No. 525-2. Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises and Evaluation. Ft. McPherson, GA: 2 December 1974. Basic regulation covering responsibilities of installation commanders in conducting deployment readiness exercises.
- US Department of Army. Hq FORSCOM. Message 092030Z January 1975. Requests DA approval of FORSCOM request to monitor HLC troop list in manner similar to Airborne D package.
- US Department of Army. Forces Command. Programming Plan 1-75. Ft. McPherson, GA: 1 April 1975. CONFIDENTIAL. Includes guidance and troop lists for all current FORSCOM intensively managed force packages. Appendix 3 to Annex A is troop list for HLC package.
- US Department of Army. Hq Training & Doctrine Command. Contingency Packages. Ft. Monroe, VA: 23 August 1973. CONFIDENTIAL. Letter advises ACSFOR of TRADOC plans for HLC review and requests consolidation of HLC review with ongoing TRADOC evaluation of corps force in furtherance of combat development mission.
- US Department of Army. Training & Doctrine Command Regulation 71-4. TRADOC Standard Scenarios. Ft. Monroe, VA: 19 October 1973. TRADOC regulation establishes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the development and use of TRADOC scenarios in the combat developments process.

- US Department of Army. Hq TRADOC. Contingency Packages. Ft. Monroe, VA: 28 March 1974. CONFIDENTIAL. Initial observations of CDR, TRADOC to DCSOPS on capabilities of a light corps. Requests DA initiate study of mobility capabilities before further analysis of light corps deployment to other areas is begun.
- US Department of Army. Hq TRADOC. Personal letter to Army Chief of Staff for commanders of TRADOC and FORSCOM, 17 July 1974. SECRET. Provides summary of significant findings of HLC study conducted at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas during previous six months.
- US Department of Army. Hq TRADOC. Personal letter to Army Chief of Staff from Commanders of TRADOC and FORSCOM, 10 January 1975. SECRET. Provides additional observations on HLC analysis and identified problem areas for further study. (Letter was personally delivered to CSA by CDR, TRADOC at 23 January 1975 briefing on HLC analysis.)
- US Department of Army. Hq TRADOC. Personal letter to Army Chief of Staff from CDR, TRADOC, 4 April 1975. Advises of actions taken in response to letter of 14 February. Describes use of SCORES in weapons system analysis.
- US Department of Army. XVIII Airborne Corps/USARFOR Airborne 'D' Package 700 AD. Ft. Bragg, NC: 8 January 1974. CONFIDENTIAL. Basic regulation covering establishment of "D" package. Includes responsibilities of subordinate commanders.
- US Department of Army. Hq XVIII Airborne Corps. After-Action Report CPX CABER WARRIOR II. Ft. Bragg, NC: 12 March 1975. CONFIDENTIAL. Findings and recommendations of CPX of light corps September-November 1974.
- US Department of Defense. Comptroller. The Economics of Defense Spending. A Look at the Realities. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972. Source of historical data during 1968-72.
- US Department of Defense. Defense Policy and Planning Guidance. Washington: 22 October 1974. SECRET. SECDEF guidance for development of forces to meet various specified contingencies.
- Westmoreland, GEN William C. Posture Statement Presented to the 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969. Washington: US Department of Defense, 22 July 1969. (US 23 A51 1969 W4).
- _____. Posture Statement Presented to the 91st Congress, 2d Session, 1970. Washington: US Department of Defense, undated. (UA 23 A51 1970 W4).

_____. Posture Statement Presented to the 92d Congress, 1st Session, 1971. Washington: US Department of Defense, undated. (UA 23 A51 1971 W4).

_____. Posture Statement Presented to the 92d Congress, 2d Session, 1972. Washington: US Department of Defense, undated. (US 23 A51 1972 W4).

Weyand, GEN Fred C. Posture Statement Presented to the 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975. Washington: US Department of Defense, 7 February 1975. (UA 23 A51 1975 W4).

ANNEX A
LIST OF INTERVIEWS

20 April - 1 May 1975

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>
22 April 1975	Ft. Bliss, Texas	COL J. D. Frydendall	Director of Plans and Training, USA Air Defense Center
		Mr. W. R. Webster	Plans Officer, DPT, USAADC
		LTC J. J. Yeosock	Former Squadron CDR, 3d Armored Cavalry Rgt.
		MAJ P. Holman	S3, 11th Air Det Gp.
23-25 April	Ft. Hood, Texas	COL R. H. Nevins, Jr.	G3, III Corps
		LTC J. R. Karriker	Plans Div, G3, III Corps
		LTC R. Dinwiddie	Plans, G4, III Corps
		LTC Moses	Exercise Planning Group
28 April	Ft. McPherson, GA	LTC R. D. Byrd	Plans, DCS Ops, Hq FORSCOM
		MAJ G. P. Williams	Readiness, DCS Ops, Hq FORSCOM
29-30 April	Ft. Bragg, NC	COL J. Jamieson	Dep G3, XVIII Abn Corps
		COL E. Pendleton	CDR, 1st COSCOM
		COL C. Vuono	CDR, 82d Div Arty
		LTC Flanagan	Dep G4, XVIII Abn Corps

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>
		LTC Liepiss	Plans, G4, XVIII Abn Corps
		LTC D. Hilbert	G3, 82d Abn Div
		LTC H. Jones	G4, 82d Abn Div
1 May	Ft. Monroe, VA	COL R. Segal	Cbt Dev Plng Gp, Hq TRADOC
		COL G. Krause	Force Plans, DCSCD, Hq TRADOC
		LTC R. Ross	Force Plans, DCSCD, Hq TRADOC

ANNEX B
CHAPTER 2
(U) METHODOLOGY

July 1974

Section I. (U) SCORES Methodology

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. The scenario Oriented Recurring Evaluation System (SOORES) is a combat developments process developed jointly by Headquarters, TRADOC, and subordinate coordinating centers and branch schools for use in TRADOC study efforts. The SCORES process possesses certain basic characteristics, summarized as follows:

a. SCORES evaluations are based on TRADOC standard scenarios. Thus, commonly based evaluation efforts of TRADOC can be integrated, coordinated, and compared.

b. SCORES is designed to assess capabilities and limitations of current or hypothesized forces and to generate recommendations which will result in improved force capabilities.

c. SCORES is used for evaluations of organizational, doctrinal, or materiel capabilities.

d. SCORES uses jiffy manual wargaming techniques to dynamically expand the starting scenario and produce conflict outcomes and other data for evaluation.

e. The SCORES process is flexible in the sense that short-term, low-resolution evaluations of a force package are possible as well as longer, more detailed evaluations.

f. SCORES is a communicating and integrating vehicle which permits participating centers or schools to use the military expertise of other TRADOC organizations in accomplishing combat developments efforts. The products of SCORES evaluations should fully represent the efforts of the TRADOC elements best qualified to make the evaluations.

2. (U) BACKGROUND. Development of a new methodology for conduct of TRADOC

combat developments studies commenced in May 1973. Originally referred to as the "Living Model," development of this methodology was initiated by CACDA with assistance provided by the TRADOC centers and schools. In September 1973, development of the Living Model methodology had progressed sufficiently to initiate a test case of the process. The capability of a

2-I-2-1

(Extracted from CACDA Study, Heavy/Light Corps Middle East Evaluation (U), Volume 2A, July 1974. CONFIDENTIAL.

Division to conduct a surveillance mission across an extended front was evaluated with all TRADOC centers and schools providing results of their test case evaluations to CACDA in October 1973. At that time, TRADOC decided that the Living Model process would be employed as the mechanism for conduct of the HLC-ME Study (ACN 21963) -- a DA/DCSOPS, directed effort. Subsequently, the name of the process was changed from the "Living Model" to "SCPRES." Review of tentative results produced in the ME I portion of the HLC-ME Study by a TRADOC Commander's Conference at Fort Leavenworth on 12-13 March 1974 brought significant changes to the SCORES process itself. The methodology described in paragraph 3 reflects those changes.

3. (U) SCORES METHODOLOGY.

a. General. SCORES is an evaluation process developed to analyze forces, organizations, doctrine, and materiel as they are currently found, or in other hypothesized arrangements, to isolate problem areas, and to provide recommendations for improvement. The SCORES process is two-phased. Phase I is referred to as the Force Analysis Phase, while Phase II is a detailed analysis phase. Figure 2-I-2-2 depicts the logic for the SCORES Detailed Analysis (Phase II). In any combat developments study employing the SCORES process. Phase I is a relatively rapid, low-resolution analysis of the issues being studied, while Phase II consists of more lengthy, finegrained analysis. The methodology calls for the results of Phase I analysis to be reviewed by a TRADOC senior officers' group to determine the key issues pertaining to the force being studied which are appropriate for Phase II analyses and to plan future efforts. A detailed discussion of Phase I and Phase II activities follows with discussion keyed to figures 2-I-2-1 and 2-I-2-2. It should be noted here that in the conduct of the HLC-ME Study only Phase I analysis was completed for the ME I and ME II portions of the study. (This report presents the results of this Phase I effort.) Detailed analyses of ME-I and ME-II study objectives are on-going at TRADOC centers/schools.

46

b. Force Analysis (Phase I). Figure 2-I-2-1 depicts the flow of major activities performed in a SCORES force design study. Given a tasking directive from TRADOC which identifies study objectives, assumptions, constraints, and selection of a standard TRADOC scenario for combat developments to be used.




Figure 2-1-2-1. SCORES force analysis (phase 1) logic




Figure 2-1-2-2. SCORES detailed analysis (phase 2) logic

CAC begins development of a study plan and a campaign plan (block 1). The study plan lays out the study schedule, identifies essential elements of analysis (FEA) to satisfy study objectives, defines measures of effectiveness (MDE) which will provide answers to the FEA, and assigns analysis responsibilities to SCORES study participants. The campaign plan expands the TRADOC standard scenario to describe the sequencing of the major events that would most likely occur in the hypothesized situation. CAC, in concert with other integrating centers, then develops the study analysis plan and the operational scenario (block 2). The analysis plan expands the study plan by identifying study techniques to be employed by SCORES participants. The operational scenario developed by the integrating centers includes strategic constraints and rules of engagement; geographic, cultural, and environmental features; the composition of opposing forces; phased US operational plans; threat force operational plans; and a strategic deployment schedule. The operational scenario is then expanded into the detailed scenario by the integrating centers with assistance from the various TRADOC schools (block 3). The detailed scenario incorporates operational plans for smaller units in the force to supplement the higher-level operational plan previously developed. These plans (usually at brigade level) are prepared by the school which is proponent for each type of brigade in the force, CAC convenes workshops, as do both the Logistics and Administrative Centers, to assist in the preparation and review of scenario development efforts. Workshops occur at various points in the scenario-evaluation cycle; one workshop usually considers different aspects of several scenarios or evaluation results. Characteristics of the US force, or other matters under study in the scenario identified by the workshop are then substantiated or refuted in the conduct of the CAC Force-level, manual war game (JIFFY). This war game provides a dynamic scenario which describes the outcome of the battle in terms of battlefield movement, attrition of opposing forces, and coarse consumption rates (block 5).

Other TRADOC centers/schools may conduct phase 1 analysis of units or functions in the force for which they are proponent (block 6). As insights emerge from the analysis efforts of the various SCORES participants, it is often necessary to define alternatives which, when analyzed, will eliminate the limitations noted in the baseline force (block 7). When the various Phase I analysis activities are completed, participating centers/schools and selected organizations outside TRADOC usually participate in a workshop to consolidate all analysis results (block 8). When the Phase I results have been consolidated and reviewed, a TRADOC senior officers' workshop is convened to consider the study results and to select from those results unresolved issues that should be evaluated in detail in Phase II (block 9). Centers and schools also discuss other study or evaluation efforts for which they plan to use TRADOC standard scenarios. This is done to facilitate cooperation and avoid duplication of effort. The TRADOC senior officers' workshop is the concluding activity of Phase I in the SCORES methodology.

c. Detailed Analysis (Phase II). Figure 2-I-2-2 depicts the flow of activities in Phase II of the SCORES methodology. The TRADOC senior officers' workshop identified the key issues to be analyzed in detail by the integrating centers during Phase II (block 1). The bulk of the detailed analysis in Phase II will take place at the TRADOC schools in support of school objectives. Integrating centers may continue analysis of the force as a whole (block 2) and may engage in detailed Phase II analysis, as appropriate. Should the data required to perform a detailed analysis of a type unit be unavailable, TRADOC may initiate efforts to arrange a limited field test or field experiment to provide that data (block 3). As the various detailed analysis efforts (block 4) begin to provide results, the integrating centers evaluate those results and the impact of results on other TRADOC efforts (block 5). If certain detailed analyses results prove to have implications on other analysis efforts,

then coordination is required. For studies involving several TRADOC elements. the integrating centers coordinate the preparation of the report covering Phase II conclusions and recommendations (block 6). TRADOC then reviews SCORES Phase II results and takes appropriate action (block 7). Many Phase II evaluations are conducted for single-school purposes unrelated to other evaluations, and these may not require management by the coordinating centers.

4. (U) NATURE OF SCORES ANALYSIS RESULTS. The schematic diagram of figure 2-I-2-3 illustrates the type of analysis results to be expected from the SCORES process. The low resolution, rapid analysis conducted in Phase I




Figure 2-1-2-3. SCORES analysis results by phase